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Finding Solutions to Conflicts Between Agriculture
and the Environment
Richard F. Kazmierczak, Jr. and David W. Hughes1
Various policy instruments have
been used in an attempt to encourage
stability in the agricultural sector while
simultaneously mitigating the aggregate negative externalities of intensive
production. These policies generally
aim to directly or indirectly manipulate
the technology used by producers.
Over time, shifting policy goals and
implementation methods have also
generated differing, and sometimes
contradictory, implications for the
relative rights of producers and other
social groups. Producer anxieties over
potential property rights changes and
insistence by environmental groups for
quick action against negative externalities have often led to disputes about
the appropriate relationship between
agricultural and environmental policy
objectives. This increasingly visible
involvement of agriculture in environmental disputes has driven a search for
alternative ways of resolving conflicts
between agricultural and environmental concerns.
Alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms are usually characterized
by a formal, consensus-building
process that may encompass direct
negotiations, mediated negotiations,
and/or arbitration arrangements
(Gunton and Flynn). Although formal
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arbitration has rarely been used in an
agricultural/environmental context,
experiments with negotiation are as old
as political policy-making. More
recently, negotiation has been used to
resolve conflicts in the post development, policy implementation process
(Kirtz).
The economic rationale for negotiating agricultural/environmental
conflicts can be traced to the institutional economist John R. Commons.
Commons advocated negotiated
regulation for ensuring that an economic system yielded satisfactory
solutions to joint public-private

Modern advocates also
suggest that negotiations
result in easily implemented
and enforceable policy.
resource use problems. Commons’
approach was based on a notion of
reasonable value, which he defined
“not as a metaphysical entity discoverable through abstract logic, but an
imperfect compromise to be reached
through an administrative process”
(Ramstad). While Commons promoted
negotiated resolutions on efficiency
and equity grounds, modern advocates
also suggest that negotiations result in
easily implemented and enforceable
policy because they generate solutions
that satisfy at least part of each interest
group’s objectives (Bacow and
Wheeler; Susskind and Cruikshank).

The Nature of Conflicts
The environment can be viewed as
a scarce resource, with differing social
philosophies and economic selfinterests competing for its use, option,
and existence values. As a result, many
social problems involving agriculture
and the environment arise from
indeterminant or disputed environmental property rights. Conceptually, these
joint agricultural/environmental policy
conflicts often evolve through three
distinct phases. Conflicts initially
emerge as negative experiences that
are transformed into perceived injuries,
only later to become grievances used
to confront the parties responsible for
the perceived injury. These three
phases have been termed “naming”
(the perception that something has
become a harmful experience), “blaming” (the identification of the source of
the harm), and “claiming” (communication of the grievance to the person
believed to be responsible) (Felstiner,
Abel, and Sarat). A similar
conceptualization of the disputing
process provided the motivation for the
work of Commons.
Commons began with the assumption that there were no static natural
processes through which to coordinate
social interactions. Instead, the existing
rules governing social interactions
were considered the result of a complex series of decisions by a society to
organize in a particular way. This
economic framework suggests that the
outcome of market-based economic
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interactions is dependent on a dynamic
process of adjusting property rights,
entitlements, and other economic rules.
This concept of a structurally dynamic
economy explicitly recognizes that the
strength of a capitalist society comes
from its ability to adjust to the changing preferences of its members and the
physical or cultural conditions that
surround them.
Given the role of property rights
adjustments in Commons’ theory, it is
not surprising that he advocated a
process of negotiation to reduce
transactions costs and arrive at efficient and distributionally just resolutions to policy conflicts. But to accomplish these objectives, Commons
believed that negotiation had to be a
process through which all interest
groups could be engaged fairly and
equitably, an ideal that can be difficult
to attain when there are competing
agricultural and environmental policy
perspectives. Farm groups are typically
concerned about the apparent bureaucratic and arbitrary nature in which
environmental policies are implemented, at times without providing for
economically viable production
alternatives. Environmental groups
point to continuing difficulties in
achieving environmentally sensitive
agricultural policy because of blocking
coalitions in the agribusiness community. At stake in this conflict is a
delineation of agricultural/environmental property rights that imposes a
polluter-pays principle on agricultural
operations.

Issues in Negotiations
Because conflicts between private
and public interests occur at the level
of the individual, Commons believed
that potential solutions must be generated with the individuals’ explicit or
tacit approval. Thus, Commons
rejected the existence of public interest
and decision-making processes that
were separable from the specific
interests of individuals and welldefined social groups. Instead, he
emphasized that truly enforceable
resolutions could be obtained only

through compromise between special
interest groups with stakes in solving
the existing problem. To Commons,
the efficiency question concerned how
to accomplish this compromise in a
timely and cost-effective manner.
Commons suggested that a properly designed and mediated system of
negotiated regulation had the potential
to reduce the transaction costs that are
of concern to economists. Typical

The resulting public policies
should, in a broad sense,
represent the appropriately
weighted public interest.
transaction costs include the costs
associated with setting up contracts,
policing agreements, and obtaining
information. In reality, it is the process
of delineating public and private rights
that leads to large contractual, policing, and information costs, especially
if litigation is required or the groups
involved are slow to accept the final
delineations. But, if cooperatively
brokered, negotiated agreements have
the potential to reduce litigation and
other transaction costs embedded in
conflict resolution. Further, negotiated
agreements may prevent the establishment of static, restrictive regulations
that preclude mutually beneficial
solutions generated by technical
change.
Although motivated by transaction
efficiency, Commons also realized that
the success of a negotiated approach to
conflict resolution depended on the
distribution of bargaining power
among interest groups. Equal bargaining power, and especially the lack of
undue coercion, was considered an
essential element of negotiations. The
more equitable the negotiation processes, the more likely its outcome
would approach that of a bargain
between parties with equal economic
power. The resulting public policies
should, in a broad sense, represent the
appropriately weighted public interest
because the interest groups participate

in a quasi-market by using their votes
in negotiations to influence policy
outcomes.
To be successful, negotiation must
be managed based on four key principles (Ury). First, the conflict problem
needs to be separated from the individuals involved so that the issues are
attacked, not the individuals. Second,
negotiators must be reminded to focus
on the ultimate interests of opposing
groups, not on their public positions.
Only by having all participants understand the objectives of each group will
there be opportunities to recognize and
develop potential compromise solutions. This understanding directly
affects the third principle, which
requires that negotiators focus on
options for mutual gain. Lastly,
negotiations must be based on objective information and criteria whenever
possible, for getting agreement on the
criteria used to decide is often easier
than getting agreement on a decision
itself.

A Potential Role for Land
Grant Scientists
Perhaps the most important way
land grant scientists can participate in
negotiated agricultural/environmental
conflicts is by serving as providers of
objective information and analyses.
Information is critical to the negotiation process, and land grant institutions
have proved adept at developing
knowledge concerning the functioning
of agricultural and environmental
systems. In addition, the Extension
Service components of these institutions have a history of providing this
knowledge to the public in an easily
understandable form. However,
participation as information providers
requires that land grant institutions be
perceived as neutral to the conflict and
capable of supplying information
within a short time frame.
The public perception of neutrality
is important because the knowledge
base upon which negotiations depend
must be recognized as objective and
authoritative by all the opposing
interest groups. Effective participation
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by institutions and individual scientists
will be at least partly determined by
the amount of past public or political
advocacy conducted in the interests of
agriculture. Competing with the land
grant institutions for the role of
information provider will be the
myriad non-land grant institutions of
higher learning. Some of these alternative sources will encounter credibility
problems due to past environmental
advocacy, but many are perceived as
objective sources of information. Thus,
land grant institutions that wish to be
widely recognized as sources of
information for negotiation must
cultivate a public image of objectivity
even as they strive to serve the agricultural community that is the base of
their financial and political support.
While agricultural/environmental
conflicts may develop over many
years, the opportunities to negotiate
solutions typically occur unexpectedly
and with a sense of urgency. The
imminent start of negotiations is not
the time to begin research programs
aimed at creating the necessary information base. Instead, agricultural
scientists need to be aware of emerging
agricultural/environmental conflicts
years in advance and conduct research
programs that will supply the necessary information when it is needed in
the future. This long-run, sustained
view of agricultural research has been
a historical strength of the land grant
system. But recent moves toward
expanded private/public partnerships
in agricultural research raise the
danger that research priorities might

This long-run, sustained
view of agricultural
research has been a
historical strength of the
land grant system.
become progressively influenced by
short-term, profit-seeking behavior.
Short-term objectives may not only
divert resources from the long-term
research programs necessary for
developing the information needed by
agricultural/environmental negotiators,
but also contribute to the perceived ties
between land grants and agricultural
interests.
Given their unique mission, land
grant institutions may have some
difficulty cultivating the objective
image necessary to be widely recognized as viable information providers
to the negotiation process. However,
individual scientists and research
teams within the institutions can
cultivate a reputation for objectivity by
conducting research programs that
systematically examine all facets of
joint agricultural/environmental
problems. To the extent that they are
successful in this task, individual
scientists can probably fill the roles of
mediators in the negotiation process.
Mediators should be intimately familiar with the agricultural/environmental
conflict in question, not only from a
technical perspective but also in terms
of knowing who the relevant interest
groups are, what their ultimate objec-

tives might be, and how they might be
persuaded to join in negotiations.
Taken together, these qualifications
suggest that potential mediators within
the land grant system will come from
the ranks of experienced and active
scientists. Failing perceived objectivity, both land grant institutions and
individual scientists could have a role
in developing the strategic and tactical
negotiating strategies of a specific
interest group.
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